In April 1961, just three months into his presidency, John F. Kennedy approved one of the most catastrophic military operations in U.S. history.
1,400 Cuban exiles, trained and equipped by the CIA, would invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. They would spark a popular uprising, overthrow Fidel Castro, and install a democratic government.
That was the plan.
The reality? The invasion failed within 72 hours. Most of the brigade was killed or captured. No uprising occurred. The U.S. was humiliated internationally. Castro’s regime was strengthened, not weakened.
It was a complete disaster.
And every single warning sign had been ignored.
The Planning
The operation was inherited from the Eisenhower administration. The CIA had been training Cuban exiles in Guatemala for months.
When Kennedy’s team reviewed the plan, multiple advisors raised serious concerns:
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (historian) warned the invasion would be seen as American imperialism and would fail.
Senator William Fulbright wrote a memo arguing the operation was illegal, immoral, and likely to fail.
Military experts questioned whether 1,400 lightly-armed exiles could defeat Castro’s 200,000-strong military.
Intelligence analysts doubted there would be a popular uprising. Castro was more popular than the CIA believed.
The plan had obvious flaws:
- The invasion site was surrounded by swamps with only three exit routes
- Air support would be minimal (to maintain “plausible deniability”)
- The landing was scheduled at night on a coral reef
- Castro’s forces far outnumbered the brigade
- No contingency plans if the uprising didn’t materialize
But the meetings weren’t about whether to invade. They were about how to invade.
The decision had already been made.
The Meetings
Kennedy assembled his top advisors: the “Best and Brightest”—McNamara, Bundy, Rusk, the Joint Chiefs.
In meeting after meeting, the same dynamic played out:
CIA Director Allen Dulles assured everyone it would work. He cited the successful 1954 Guatemala coup (which had completely different circumstances).
Advisors with doubts stayed silent. They didn’t want to seem weak or indecisive. No one wanted to be the person who “lost Cuba.”
Kennedy didn’t reveal his own doubts. As the leader, his neutrality signaled approval.
Dissenting voices were dismissed. Schlesinger’s memo was ignored. Fulbright’s objections were brushed aside.
The group convinced itself:
- “The CIA knows what they’re doing”
- “We can’t look weak on communism”
- “It’s already in motion, too late to back out”
- “Everyone agrees this will work”
Except everyone didn’t agree. They just thought everyone else did.
The Invasion
On April 17, 1961, Brigade 2506 landed at the Bay of Pigs.
Everything went wrong immediately:
- The coral reef damaged landing craft
- Castro’s forces responded faster than expected
- Promised air support was cancelled (Kennedy feared international backlash)
- No popular uprising occurred
- The brigade was pinned on the beach
Within 72 hours:
- 114 killed
- 1,189 captured
- The rest scattered into the swamps
Kennedy refused to send U.S. troops, fearing it would trigger Soviet retaliation.
The operation collapsed. Castro paraded the captured exiles on television. The U.S. had to pay $53 million in food and medicine to ransom them.
It was a humiliating, total failure.
What Is Groupthink?
Psychologist Irving Janis studied the Bay of Pigs as a textbook example of groupthink—the tendency for cohesive groups to prioritize consensus over critical analysis.
The Bay of Pigs had every symptom:
1. Illusion of Invulnerability
“We’re the United States. We toppled Guatemala easily. This will work too.”
2. Collective Rationalization
“The CIA has intelligence we don’t. They must know something we don’t.”
3. Belief in Inherent Morality
“Castro is a dictator. Overthrowing him is the right thing to do.”
4. Stereotyping Outsiders
“Cubans will welcome us as liberators. Castro isn’t really popular.”
5. Self-Censorship
Schlesinger wrote a memo objecting, but toned it down and didn’t push hard in meetings.
6. Illusion of Unanimity
No one spoke up, so everyone assumed everyone agreed.
7. Direct Pressure on Dissenters
When Fulbright objected, he was sidelined and not invited to further meetings.
8. Mindguards
Kennedy’s brother Robert dismissed concerns: “We can’t look weak.”
Modern Examples
Groupthink isn’t ancient history. It’s everywhere:
1. Theranos
- Board of directors with no medical expertise
- Elizabeth Holmes convinced everyone blood tests worked
- Dissenting scientists silenced or fired
- Result: Fraud, endangered patients, prison
2. WeWork’s IPO Disaster
- Board convinced of Adam Neumann’s genius
- Skeptics dismissed
- Valuation of $47B collapsed to $8B
- Result: Failed IPO, CEO ousted
3. Boeing 737 MAX
- Engineers raised concerns about MCAS system
- Management prioritized speed to market
- “It’s fine, we’ve always done it this way”
- Result: 346 deaths, $20B in losses
4. Enron
- Executives convinced themselves of invincibility
- Accountants went along
- Whistleblowers ignored
- Result: Bankruptcy, criminal charges
In Software Engineering
Groupthink sabotages tech teams constantly:
The Big Rewrite
Team convinces itself: "The codebase is unmaintainable"
Reality: It works, it just needs refactoring
Dissenters: "This seems risky"
Response: "You're being negative, trust the team"
Result: 2-year rewrite, 50% of features lost, startup dies
Microservices for Everything
Groupthink: "Monoliths are dead, everyone's doing microservices"
Reality: 5-person startup doesn't need 20 microservices
Skeptic: "Is this overkill?"
Response: "You don't understand modern architecture"
Result: Operational nightmare, can't ship features
Hiring the “Culture Fit”
Team likes candidate: "They'd fit right in"
Dissenting interviewer: "They seem weak on algorithms"
Response: "Culture fit matters more"
Result: Underperformer who can't do the job
Ignoring Tech Debt
Team: "We'll fix it after we ship"
Realist: "We never fix it after shipping"
Response: "We can't slow down now"
Result: System collapses under technical debt
Production Deploy on Friday
Team: "It's a small change, it'll be fine"
Engineer: "What if something breaks?"
Response: "Don't be paranoid, deploy it"
Result: Site down all weekend, all-hands firefight
How Kennedy Fixed It
After the Bay of Pigs disaster, Kennedy completely restructured how his team made decisions:
1. He Encouraged Dissent
Told advisors: “I want everyone to challenge assumptions.”
2. He Stayed Out of Early Meetings
Didn’t attend initial discussions so his opinion wouldn’t anchor the group.
3. He Created Competing Teams
Split advisors into groups that developed separate recommendations.
4. He Brought in Outside Experts
Invited people with no stake in the decision to critique plans.
5. He Assigned Devil’s Advocates
Robert Kennedy’s job became “argue against the consensus.”
6. He Questioned Everything
“Why do we believe this? What’s the evidence? What could go wrong?”
18 months later, this new process was tested: the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Using the new decision-making structure, Kennedy navigated the most dangerous moment of the Cold War without starting World War III.
Same team. Different process. Saved the world.
How to Prevent Groupthink
1. Make Dissent Safe
Reward people who raise concerns, not just those who agree.
"Thanks for raising that. Let's dig into it."
Not: "You're being negative again."
2. Assign a Devil’s Advocate
Someone’s job is to argue the opposite position.
"For this meeting, Sarah will argue why this is a bad idea.
Everyone else, argue why it's good."
3. Leaders Go Last
Don’t reveal your opinion first. Let the team debate freely.
4. Separate Evaluation from Generation
Don’t critique ideas while brainstorming. Generate first, critique later.
5. Bring in Outsiders
Fresh eyes catch what insiders miss.
"Let's have the infrastructure team review our architecture."
6. Do Pre-Mortems
Imagine the project failed. Why?
"It's a year from now. This rewrite was a disaster. What happened?"
7. Track Decisions Over Time
Review past decisions. Were the confident ones actually right?
This calibrates your confidence and reveals groupthink patterns.
The Deeper Lesson
The Bay of Pigs wasn’t a failure of intelligence. The intelligence was there.
It wasn’t a failure of expertise. Experts warned it would fail.
It was a failure of process.
Smart people, in a group, convinced themselves of something obviously wrong—because the group dynamics overrode individual judgment.
Groupthink doesn’t feel like irrationality. It feels like consensus.
It feels like:
- “We’re all on the same page”
- “Great minds think alike”
- “The team is aligned”
Until it crashes into reality.
The Programmer’s Perspective
As engineers, we think we’re immune to this. We have tests. We have CI/CD. We have code review.
But groupthink isn’t about technical process. It’s about social process.
It’s:
- The PR everyone rubber-stamps because no one wants to block it
- The architecture decision everyone goes along with because the senior dev suggested it
- The deadline everyone knows is impossible but no one challenges
We’ve built elaborate technical safeguards.
But we haven’t built social safeguards.
And the most catastrophic failures aren’t technical—they’re human.
Key Takeaways
- ✅ Smart groups make catastrophically bad decisions when consensus is prioritized
- ✅ Dissent must be actively encouraged, not just tolerated
- ✅ Leaders should withhold opinions to avoid anchoring the group
- ✅ Process matters more than expertise
- ✅ Kennedy learned from failure and redesigned decision-making
Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs invasion. Not because he was stupid, but because he was surrounded by smart people who all convinced each other it would work.
After the disaster, he said: “How could I have been so stupid?”
But it wasn’t stupidity. It was groupthink.
The same team that failed at the Bay of Pigs succeeded during the Cuban Missile Crisis—not because they got smarter, but because they changed how they made decisions.
The next time you’re in a meeting and everyone agrees, that’s not a good sign.
That’s a red flag.
Because when everyone agrees, either:
- The decision is obvious (rare)
- Or groupthink is happening (common)
Ask yourself: Are we thinking critically?
Or are we just agreeing?
Because 1,400 Cuban exiles learned the difference the hard way.